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Economists and legal scholars routinely posit an implicit contract
between Japanese ﬁrms and their principal lender (called their "main
bank"). Under this arrangement, the bank implicitly agrees to rescue
the ﬁrm (through ﬁnancial and managerial help) when times turn bad.
Out of court, it rescues the ﬁrm from insolvency. Not only does it
save the investments speciﬁc to the troubled ﬁrm, it lowers the use of
costly bankruptcy proceedings and cuts the costs of those bankruptcy
procedures ﬁrms do occasionally invoke.
Given the creditor-shareholder conﬂicts of interest that arise as
ﬁrms approach insolvency, such arrangements would seem unstable.
Yet according to a long sociological tradition, conﬂicts of interest
matter less in Japan than in the West. According to the emerging
economic and legal tradition, Japanese economic actors do face
those conﬂicts, but keep them in check through reputational concerns,
close-knit ties, and government supervision.
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Using two datasets of troubled ﬁrms from the 1970s and 1980s, we
ask whether Japanese main banks in fact rescue distressed borrowers.
We ﬁnd no evidence that they do: large Japanese ﬁrms fail; when large
ﬁrms approach insolvency, main banks do not increase the share of
the ﬁrm’s debt they bear; stronger ties between distressed ﬁrms and
their main bank do not facilitate loans; and troubled ﬁrms do not try
to preserve their main bank relationship.
All told, the claim that Japanese banks ever implicitly agreed to
rescue ﬁrms is sheer myth. That Japanese banks let troubled ﬁrms
fail is no recent development; it has been thus for decades. Conﬂicts
of interest do indeed matter in Japan and long have. They matter
enough to prevent precisely the incentive-incompatible rescue deals
that scholars in the ﬁeld so routinely posit.
INTRODUCTION
By a long sociological tradition, conﬂicts of interest in Japan largely do
not matter. Japanese live lives so circumscribed by norms of loyalty and
duty that ﬁrms need not concern themselves with the conﬂicts that plague
their peers in the West. By the emerging economic and law-&-economics
approach, conﬂicts do matter in the Japanese business world. Yet they
primarily matter in ways that ﬁrms overcome. Through close relationships,
reputational concerns, and government supervision, Japanese ﬁrms resolve
the conﬂicts of interest that stymie so many potential transactions in the
West.
To understand the impact of conﬂicts of interest in Japan, we examine
creditor-shareholder ties as ﬁrms approach insolvency. According to an
increasingly large and theoretically sophisticated literature, the principal
lender (called the "main bank") to a Japanese ﬁrm implicitly agrees to
rescue it (through ﬁnancial and managerial help) should it fall into distress.
The claim should puzzle. After all, basic logic suggests that conﬂicts of
interest between creditors and shareholders become most intense as ﬁrms
approach insolvency. What logic suggests, however, the literature denies.
Despite clear conﬂicts of interest, despite the absence of legally enforceable
arrangements, despite the obvious incentive incompatibility — despite all
this,accordingtotheliterature,ﬁrmsandbanksroutinelykeeptheir(implicit)
word.
The implications for bankruptcy law follow straightforwardly. Because
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(at least so bankruptcy law proponents claim)1 ﬁrms typically embody
substantialﬁrm-speciﬁctangibleandintangibleassets,societybeneﬁtsifthose
thatencounterﬁnancialdistresscanweatheritintact.Unfortunately,conﬂicts
of interest and informational asymmetries among creditors, managers, and
shareholders often prevent them from doing so on their own. Hence
bankruptcy:throughthecourts,creditors,debtors,andshareholdersnegotiate
the terms ofthe deal that will salvagetheﬁrm-speciﬁc investmentsthey have
made.
In Japan, argue the specialists, the main bank accomplishes what
bankruptcy judges do in the U.S. at far less cost. Because all creditors
recognize that the main bank bears responsibility for rescuing the ﬁrm,
collective action problems disappear. Because the main bank monitors
the ﬁrm assiduously, informational asymmetries between creditors and
managers disappear as well. Engineer analogous arrangements elsewhere,
the specialists imply, and social welfare will increase and the need for
bankruptcy law fall.
The main bank literature encompasses a broad panoply of claims beyond
this bank-rescue argument. Given that we discuss those claims elsewhere,2
we do not attempt a comprehensive critique here. Instead, we limit ourselves
to the claims about bank rescues. We begin by summarizing the literature
(Section I). To clarify the issues involved, we introduce several examples
fromthe1970s(SectionII).Wethenexplainourdataandreportourempirical
results(SectionIII).WeﬁndnoevidencethatJapanesebanksrescuedtroubled
ﬁrms either in the depressed 1970s or in the booming 1980s. Weconclude by
speculating aboutwhat role banksdoplay (Section IV).
1 The claim is rarely tested and dubious at best, as Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002) shows.
2 Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and
ComparativeCorporateGovernance,27Law&Soc. Inquiry401(2002)[hereinafter
Miwa&Ramseyer,TheMythoftheMainBank];YoshiroMiwa&J.MarkRamseyer,
Financial Malaise and the Myth of the Misgoverned Bank, in Global Markets,
DomesticInstitutions: Corporate Law and Governance in aNewEraof Cross-Border
Deals 339 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) [hereinafter Miwa & Ramseyer, Financial
Malaise]; Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Appoints Them, What Do
they Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan, 14 Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Miwa & Ramseyer, Outside Directors]; Yoshiro
Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter? The Myth of the
Japanese Main Bank, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter
Miwa & Ramseyer, Relationship Banking].
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I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN JAPAN
A. The Tradition
Few traditions in Japanese business studies trace a nobler lineage than the
notion that Japanese executives keep their word. According to some, they
keep it out of an ingrained sense of Confucian loyalty. According to others,
they keep it out of an austere samurai tradition. And according to still others,
they keep it because they live in such a closely-knit circle that social norms
bind tightly.
TheclassicinthegenreisKawashima.3Apioneeroflaw&societyresearch
in Japan, Takeyoshi Kawashima argued that Japanese live within a closely-
knit hierarchical world that forestalls a strong sense of individual entitlement
("legal consciousness," he called it). Absent that sense, they cannot, do not,
and need not negotiate the elaborate contractual safeguards that Westerners
takeforgranted.
In the decades since, scholars have repeated this argument endlessly.
Amongprominentrecentwriters,RonaldDore4hasperhapspusheditfarthest.
Becauseoftheirsocialorganization,claimsDore,Japaneseexecutivesindulge
lessselﬁshnessandpracticemorebenevolencethantheirAmericanandBritish
counterparts. With less self-interested executives, Japanese ﬁrms need not
concernthemselveswithconﬂictsofinterestasobsessivelyastheirAmerican
and British competitors.5
Other writers have been more skeptical — but, alas, not skeptical enough.
They routinely assert, for example, that Japanese ﬁrms exploit women —
but never explain why other ﬁrms do not use the chance to hire good
employees cheap by treating women fairly. They claim Japanese ﬁrms cheat
consumers — but do not explain why rival ﬁrms do not steal market share
by exposing the fraud. They claim big Japanese ﬁrms exploit their smaller
3 Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in Law in
Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed.,
1963); Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan,7
Law in Japan 1 (Charles Stevens trans., 1974).
4 Ronald Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism; Japan and Germany
versus the Anglo-Saxons (2000).
5 A parallel tradition in the sociological, legal, and business scholarship on Japan
asserts (incomprehensibly to anyone with a serious background in economics) that
shareholders simply do not matter in Japan. This obviously makes it easier for
scholars to ignore conﬂicts of interest in insolvency.
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subcontractors — but never explain why anyone becomes a subcontractor
in the ﬁrst place. They claim Japanese bureaucrats guide the economy —
but do not (beyond platitudes about Confucianism and demonstrably false
claims about government power6)explain whyﬁrmsdoasbureaucratssay.
Eveninﬁnance,scholarsroutinelyslighttheimpactofconﬂictsofinterest.
Some argue that Japanese banks extract substantial rents from the ﬁrms that
use them as their main bank — but never explain why those ﬁrms do not
switch banks. Some assert that ﬁrms in the keiretsu corporate groups pay
higher interest rates to the group bank — but, again, without explaining why
they do not take their business elsewhere. Indeed, even those other scholars
who attribute all manner of virtue to the keiretsu never answer (or even
pose) the obvious Chicago workshop question: If the keiretsu confer such
beneﬁts, why does market competition not lead all Japanese ﬁrms to join
one and cause ﬁrms elsewhere to organize analogous arrangements?
B. Conﬂicts during Economic Distress
1. Introduction
Asthe examplesfromﬁnanceshow,over thepasttwodecades thepractice of
ignoring Japanese conﬂicts of interest has migrated into economics and law
& economics. Most prominently, the practice appears in accounts of how
Japanese ﬁrms negotiate insolvency. One might have thought insolvency the
place where conﬂicts among shareholders, managers, and creditors become
most pointed. By most accounts, though, in Japan those conﬂicts rarely
surface.
The story begins with the "main bank." Although Japanese ﬁrms typically
borrowfrom several banks, most observersclaim they maintainan"implicit"
contract with one of the several as their main bank. Under nolegalobligation
to do so, that bank then provides a variety of services. For purposes of this
study, we focus on one: the main bank rescues borrowers in distress.
2. Bank Rescues
According to the conventional wisdom, the main bank implicitly agrees to
save troubled borrowers. Just what the rescue entails varies from scholar
to scholar, but most seem to believe that the main bank will lend money,
resources, and personnel. As Hoshi & Kashyap put it, when "ﬁrms [run] into
6 See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Directed Credit? The Loan Market in
High-Growth Japan, 13 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 171 (2004).
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ﬁnancial difﬁculty," the main bank "step[s] up and organize[s] a workout."7
ByAoki’saccount,itlaunches"rescueoperations[that]preventthepremature
liquidation of temporarily depressed, but potentially productive, ﬁrms."8
Milgrom&Robertsclaimitserves"asanultimaterisk-bearerincircumstances
of ﬁnancial distress,"9 and Macey & Miller describe the resulting tradeoff as
one where "ﬁrms sacriﬁce control and ﬂexibility for the safety and security
of a main bank relationship."10 Just as the centralized state in Eastern Europe
would forestall wasteful failures by setting production schedules in advance,
so the Japanese main bank prevents them by sending funds and experts as
necessary.
And just as the mid-century Marxists had to finesse profound conflicts
of interest to make their tales of the socialist Valhalla even plausibly
coherent, so too current main bank theorists. Faced with borrowers in
distress, they proclaim, Japanese main banks advance extra funds unsecured.11
They send their own staff (often as board directors) to revamp management.12
They guarantee the firm’s debts.13 They abandon their security interests and
subordinate their claims to those of their competitors.14 And all this they do
undernolegalobligation, indeedwith nowritten orunwritten agreement atall.
3. Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein
Of the many studies in the ﬁeld, the best-known probably remain those
by Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein.15 According to Hoshi et al., the closer
the ties a ﬁrm maintains to its main bank, the less constraining it ﬁnds
7 Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The
Road to the Future 5 (2001).
8 Masahiko Aoki, Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity:
Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and the Transitional Economies 86 (Stacey
Jehlik trans., 2000) (1995).
9 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding
Japanese Economic Organization, 9 Estudios Economicos 3, 24 (1994).
10 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States,
48 Stan. L. Rev. 73, 85 (1995).
11 Takatoshi Ito, The Japanese Economy 116 (1992).
12 Randall Morck et al., Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan,
73 J. Bus. 539, 540 (2000); Paul Sheard, Banks, Blockholders and Corporate
Governance: The Role of External Appointees to the Board, in Japanese Firms,
Finance and Markets 181 (Paul Sheard ed., 1996).
13 Aoki, supra note 8, at 71.
14 Id. at 83.
15 Takeo Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress
in Japan, 27 J. Fin Econ. 67 (1990) [hereinafter Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks];
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ﬁnancialdistress.AsBhandari&Weissexplainthework,"thetypicallyclose
relationship between a ﬁnancing bank and a debtor ﬁrm in Japan reduces the
dispersion and coordination problems among a ﬁrm’s creditors" and creates
a world with a "relative lack of conﬂict among creditors."16 In the end, not
only does this cut the cost of ﬁnancial distress to most ﬁrms, it reduces the
"need for bankruptcy" in Japan and lowers the "costs of those bankruptcy
reorganizations that do occur."
Given the price it pays to rescue troubled ﬁrms, a bank that implicitly
agrees to supply such aid potentially faces a subgame-imperfect strategy.
Given the resulting risk that it will renege, rational ﬁrms and banks should at
least negotiate legally enforceable claims. They negotiate none. According
to main bank theorists, they leave the deal "implicit." They do not just leave
it unwritten: they leave it unspoken to boot.
Faced with why Japanese ﬁrms would rely on unspoken assumptions
in this conﬂict-ridden environment, Sheard dismisses the question as
"somewhat of a puzzle."17 Aoki claims Ministry of Finance bureaucrats
manipulate branch bank license denials to engineer a world where banks
implement the knife-edge optimal strategy: rescue ﬁrms if, but only if,
ﬁnanciallydistressedbuteconomicallyhealthy.18Bycontrast,Rajan19simply
assuresusthatin Japan,"reputational concerns" make itallwork.
In their more extended discussion of main bank ﬁnancial assistance based
on a 125-ﬁrm sample of distressed ﬁrms, Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein
largely ignore the question. Given the costs of rescuing distressed ﬁrms,
one might wonder how effectively banks could resolve the conﬂicts among
Takeo Hoshi et al., Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing
StructureofJapaneseCorporateBankingRelationships,inAsymmetricInformation,
Corporate Finance, and Investment 105 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1990); Takeo Hoshi
et al., Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese
Industrial Groups, 106 Q.J. Econ. 33 (1991).
16 Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, Experiences of Other Countries, in
Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives 449, 449 (Jagdeep S.
Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996).
17 Paul Sheard, Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring in the Japanese Main Bank System,
8 J. Japanese & Int’l Econ. 1, 17 (1994).
18 Aoki, supra note 8. One might have thought the distinction hard enough even for
the executives at a ﬁrm’s main bank to make. Yet according to Aoki, Ministry of
Finance bureaucrats determine ex ante what level of branch banking application
denials based on failures to rescue defaulting debtors will cause banks to adopt that
optimal knife-edge rescue strategy: rescue if, but only if, a ﬁrm is economically
healthy but ﬁnancially distressed. For some of the many problems with this claim,
see Miwa & Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank, supra note 2, at 408-09.
19 Raghuram G. Rajan, Review, 34 J. Econ. Lit. 1363, 1364 (1996).
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themselves.20AnswerHoshietal.:it"iscleartoallmembersintheconsortium
that the main bank is responsible for helping the ﬁrm in times of distress."21
One might wonder whether the bank and ﬁrm would not face informational
asymmetries that stymie close cooperation. Answer Hoshi et al.: "the main
bank isprobably well-informed about theﬁrm andits prospects."22
All this might be more plausible if ﬁrms and banks deliberately were
to try to cut any of these deals. Yet not only do banks and ﬁrms never
negotiate legally enforceable rescue contracts, they never even designate a
bank as main bank. Hoshi,Kashyap & Scharfstein’sreference to the contrary
notwithstanding, they do not even lend as consortia.23
Despite the superﬁcial facility with which Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein
describe the main bank arrangements, they themselves ﬁnd it more
ambiguous in practice. To partition their sample by the strength of the
bank-ﬁrm relationship,24 they invoke the keiretsu. To identify the latter,
however, they simply use the English version of one of several loan-based
lists marketed in Japanese by a Marxist think-tank.25 Even this they ﬁnd
moreambiguousinpracticethanonemightthinkandnotethatidentifyingthe
keiretsu ties "requires some judgment."26
4. The Project
Ultimately, the question is not just why Japanese ﬁrms and banks do not
draft rescue contracts explicitly. The question is whether they make such
20 Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks, supra note 15.
21 Id. at 73. They also write that "free-rider problems may be les severe [because of]
the repeated participation of banks in lending consortiums." Id. at 73. As noted in
the text, the banks do not lend as consortia. In addition, Hoshi et al., claim that
"free-rider problems are less severe" because "there are fewer creditors and the main
bank holds a large ﬁnancial stake in the ﬁrm." Id. at 72-73. In fact, even during the
1960s, large Japanese ﬁrms borrowed only 15-20% of their debt from their main
banks. See Miwa & Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank, supra note 2, at 419.
22 Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks, supra note 15, at 69.
23 Id. at 73.
24 Id. at 77-78.
25 In other words, they use the variation on the Keiretsu no kenkyu list, which appears
in a 1984 article published in English by Nakatani (Iwao Nakatani, The Economic
Role of Financial Corporate Grouping, in The Economic Analysis of the Japanese
Firm 227 (Masahiko Aoki ed., 1984)) — to which they somewhat euphemistically
refer as "Nakatani’s (1984) reﬁnement" of the list; thus, it is not the Dodwell
equity-based list often used by English-speaking scholars. On the incoherence of all
these rosters, see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the Keiretsu,1 1
J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 169 (2002).
26 Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks, supra note 15, at 77.
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arrangements at all. Because the arrangements would invite such obvious
adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems, basic logic suggests ﬁrms and
banks would avoid them studiously. Yet according to the literature, in Japan
they (at least the large ﬁrms) maintain them almost uniformly.
II. EXAMPLES
A. Introduction
At the ﬁrm level, the data at least suggest that Japanese banks do not
necessarily try to save all large troubled ﬁrms. If they do not try to save ex
post, of course, they cannot credibly (albeit implicitly) promise to save ex
ante. More generally, the examples below suggest that Japanese banks and
ﬁrms neither suppress conﬂicts of interest nor ignore them. Instead, exactly
as micro-theory implies, they routinely ﬁnd their options upon insolvency
constrained by severe conﬂicts of interest.
Take several troubled ﬁrms in the 1970s.27 We suspect that readers
will ﬁnd their travails depressingly familiar. That familiarity, however, is the
point:theveryconﬂictsofinterestthatplaguebanksandtroubledﬁrmsinthe
West plague banks and ﬁrms in Japan, cause the same problems, and induce
participantsto adoptmuchthe same strategies.
B. Mazda
Thanks to the tale Pascale & Rohlen told twenty years ago,28 Mazda
has served as the poster child of Japanese bank rescues ever since. As they
told it, the ﬁrm entered the 1970s with an iron-willed, engineering-obsessed,
and somewhat pig-headed CEO from the original Matsuda family. Under
his leadership, it invested heavily in rotary engines. Alas, when the OPEC-
inducedpricehikeshitinthemiddleofthedecade,consumersabandonedthe
technologically ﬂashy rotaries for the dowdy but more fuel-efﬁcient piston
enginesfromToyota, Nissan, and Honda.
To turn Mazda around, the Sumitomo Bank stepped in as main bank.
27 The accounts are taken from the following periodicals: Ekonomisuto (Mar. 7, 1978;
Mar. 18, 1978; Apr. 23, 1978; May 2, 1978; June 3, 1978; June 27, 1978); Shukan
daiyamondo (Jan. 10, 1976); Nikkei bijinesu (Dec. 19, 1977); Chuo koron (Winter
1978: Spec. Mgmt. Prob. Issue); Toyo keizai (June 8, 1974; May 13, 1978; May 27,
1978; Nov. 4, 1978; Feb. 24, 1979; Apr. 20, 1979), and relevant securities ﬁlings.
28 Richard Pascale & Thomas P. Rohlen, The Mazda Turnaround, 9 J. Japanese Stud.
219 (1983).
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It sent personnel, loaned money, repositioned the product line, enforced
austerity — and saved the ﬁrm. In improving the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow during
this "rescue stage," write Pascale & Rohlen, the Sumitomo Bank "played the
pivotal role ..., its bold action virtually guaranteeing the company’s debts."29
YetthewayMazdareactedtothebankbeliesthenotionthattheyimplicitly
agreed that the bank would rescue the ﬁrm. Had they cut such a deal ex
ante, the bank should not have faced the resistance it did ex post. In fact, as
Pascale & Rohlen acknowledge, the ﬁrm fought the bank at every turn —
with its managers referring to the new arrivals as the "occupying army."30
Under pressure in December 1974, Mazda accepted several outsiders to
its thirty-member board. Other than one local banker appointed in 1967, it
had not named bankers to its board for years. In time, however, it would
name outside directors from a variety of sources. They would come not just
from the Sumitomo Bank, but also from the Sumitomo Trust Bank, two
local banks, and the trading companies with which Mazda dealt.
Although Mazda named a Sumitomo Bank representative vice-president
in early 1976, it was late 1977 before the outsiders could oust the pig-headed
Matsuda as CEO. When they did, they did not ﬁre him or install a banker in
his stead. Instead, the ﬁrm named him Chairman of the Board and replaced
him with its incumbent third-in-command, a long-term Mazda engineer. By
1978, Mazda still had only four banker directors.
To keep Mazda viable, several entities provided crucial support. The
Sumitomo Bank and Sumitomo Trust Bank both sent money. In November
of 1979, Ford took a 25% equity interest. The director from the Trust Bank
directed capital budgeting issues; one director from the Sumitomo Bank
managed exports while another directed accounting and cost-controls; the
director from the C. Itoh trading ﬁrm coordinated sales; and the director
from Sumitomo Trading took charge of managerial consolidation.
Pascale & Rohlen characterize the story as a bank rescue, but one should
wonder. The Sumitomo Bank never had the stake in Mazda that ordinarily
would induce anyone to invest large resources in saving a ﬁrm. Although
it had lent more to Mazda than anyone else, it had long kept its loan share
modest: 13.6% in October 1974 and 14.5% in October 1977. Indeed, by
October 1977 it was cutting its loans to Mazda: from 53.6 billion yen in
October 1976 to 46.1 billion in October 1977, and by October 1980 to 26.3
billion. As of 1974 (and still in 1977) it held less than 4% of the stock. Had
29 Id. at 257.
30 Id. at 233, 236.
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it wanted to own more, it legally could have bought up to 10%.31 Instead,it
keptitssharebelow 4% andbelow that of theNippon LifeInsurance ﬁrm.
In fact, the Sumitomo Bank did not rescue Mazda. Instead, the entities
with the greatest stakes in the ﬁrm collectively rescued it. None of them
knew how to make cars, of course, but Mazda’s problems did not lie
in automotive engineering. Instead, they lay in ﬁnancial management and
marketing. Banks do know how to balance books, and trading companies
know how to read consumer preferences and cultivate export markets. What
Mazda needed these others could contribute. They did, and Mazda survived.
Pascale & Rohlen characterize the operation as Sumitomo-Bank-led — but
probably only because they began their inquiry by looking for that bank
leadership.32
C. Eidai Industries
Although Mazda still makes cars, troubled ﬁrms do not always survive.
Sometimes, banks and trading partners intervene and fail. Eidai Industries
mass-produced pre-fabricated housing and, by the 1970s, listed its stock on
Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In the mid-1970s it found itself
outcompeted. Outmaneuvered by its rivals, in December 1975 it posted a
large loss.
Eidai’s banks had known of its travails already by late 1974. To resolve
those problems, in the fall of 1975 the largest ﬁve creditors agreed
collectivelytolenditmoreandtoexcuseitfromits2billionyensemi-annual
interest payment. True to their word, they lent large amounts. From 1971 to
1977, they increased their loans to Eidai from 7.5 billion yen to 75.3 billion
(see Table 1 below).
The banks took a variety of other steps besides. They enlisted the
participation of two trading ﬁrms that handled Eidai accounts. They
encouraged Eidai to increase its sales force. They introduced clients to
Eidai branches. They placed three bankers on Eidai’s eleven-member board.
They replaced the Eidai president, ﬁrst with a former president of a Daiwa-
Bank-afﬁliated securities ﬁrm, then with the number-four man at Daiwa
itself.
31 At the time, antitrust legislation limited shareholdings by ﬁnancial ﬁrms to 10%. In
1977, that ceiling was lowered to 5%, effective 1978.
32 Probably for much the same reason, Pascale & Rohlen attribute "a key role" to
government bureaucrats, when in fact the government did virtually nothing. Id.
at 231. Indeed, even they acknowledge that "[a]ll company ofﬁcials interviewed
denied any government involvement." Id.
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But monitoring a borrower effectively is hard. If its rivals outcompeted
Eidai, Eidai outfoxed its banks. The second Daiwa-sent president had
planned to rebuild Eidai within two years. It was not to be. Despite having
had three bankers on its board and a banker in its vice-presidential post even
before the crisis, despite eventually accepting its president and fourteen
other senior executives from the Daiwa Bank — despite all this, Eidai
carried problems that went much deeper than any bank realized. By 1978,
one year after the ambitious second Daiwa-sent president took ofﬁce, the
banks petitioned the court for its reorganization. "Banks know they’re easy
to fool," a senior Daiwa executive recalled, "but they got fooled again
anyway."33
Table 1: Loans and Loan Shares to Eidai Industries
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
A. Loan share (% ):
Daiwa Bank 18.0 10.6 12.4 18.0 21.9 27.8 33.8
Mitsubishi Trust 10.3 10.4 10.1 12.6 12.0 12.2 11.9
DKB 6.7 6.6 5.9 6.4 6.8 7.3 7.9
Bank of Tokyo 2.6 7.3 8.6 11.1 11.8 16.5 21.4
Fuji Bank 1.0 5.6 8.0 7.7 7.7 7.6 8.7
Total of top 5 38.7 40.5 45.1 55.8 60.2 71.3 83.7
B. Total Loans (billion yen):
19.4 39.5 57.2 70.4 73.1 81.3 90.0
Source: Yoshiro Miwa, Firms and Industrial Organization in Japan 114 (1996).
Notes: Figures are for the end of December of each year.
D. Sasebo Heavy Industries
When a rescue occurs and a ﬁrm survives, sometimes it survives only
by happenstance. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Sasebo Heavy
Industries ("SHI") shipbuilding ﬁrm had thrived. What with the explosive
economic growth and the increasing need for large tankers, demand had
boomed. Come 1977, however, the Arab oil embargo and the massive
revaluation of the yen (from 290.3 yen/$ in January 1977 to 195.4 in
December 1978) had turned the boom into a bust. With total industry
33 Special Management Problems Issue, Chuo koron, Winter 1978, at 334.
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shipbuilding capacity of 19 million tons, Japanese ﬁrms had 1977 orders of
only 5 million. At least the largest shipbuilding ﬁrms had diversiﬁed their
product lines. Medium-sized SHI had not. By the fall of 1978, it had no
orders at all.
Like most substantial Japanese ﬁrms, SHI borrowed broadly. From over
a dozen banks, it had borrowed (as of March 1977) over 79.7 billion yen.
Among the commercial banks, it had borrowed the most from the Daiichi
Kangyo Bank ("DKB"): 3.3 billion yen. It had four major shareholders: the
Kurushima dry-docks ﬁrm (25.0%); the Nippon Kokan ("NKK") steel ﬁrm
(24.2%); Nippon Steel (14.1%); and the Nissho Iwai trading ﬁrm (10.1%).
KurushimahadboughtitsinterestbecauseitsCEOToshioTsubouchiwanted
to integrate SHI’s large dock facility into Kurushima. When he had earlier
triedtobecomepresident,however,NKKhadblockedhismoveand,instead,
engineered the appointment of its own representative.
To deal with the non-existent demand, in early 1978, SHI asked for early
retirements. By April, 1600 employees had volunteered, but to ﬁnance their
retirement package, the ﬁrm needed 8.2 billion yen. It also would have to
ﬁnance other changes, of course, and all told could expect to need about 20
billion yen. When it approached its banks, they balked.
Rather thanvolunteerthe money, the bankstoldSHI to ﬁlefor bankruptcy.
At least on much of its debt, they held security interests. If the ﬁrm ﬁled for
bankruptcy immediately, they could expect some repayment. If they now
loaned funds unsecured (and the ﬁrm apparently had no more assets to post),
rather than repayment they could expect a steady stream of requests for
yet more funds. The additional funds they loaned would effectively become
hostage and lock them into future demands indeﬁnitely.
The banks offered to lend the money only if SHI’s lead shareholders would
guarantee the debt, but the shareholders would not guarantee. NKK controlled
SHI, and Tsubouchi — bitter still about the way NKK had blocked him
from becoming president — was not about to guarantee any loans suggested
by its handpicked managerial team. Absent a co-guarantee from Kurushima,
neither would NKK guarantee a loan. And if Tsubouchi and NKK would not
guarantee, Nippon Steel and Nissho Iwai would not do so either.
In short, neither the firm’s creditors nor its shareholders would invest
anything more in the firm. Ordinarily, such a firm would promptly go
bankrupt. It did not, but only because SHI dominated the city of Sasebo and
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda owed the city a massive political debt. When
the government’s nuclear-powered ship Mutsu had developed a radioactive
leak in 1974, all other ports had refused to take it. With a leaking nuclear ship
sitting off the Japanese coast and nowhere to send it, Fukuda faced a political
disaster. He averted it, but only when Sasebo agreed to take the ship.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009314 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 6:301
For that favor Fukuda now intervened personally. He struggled mightily
to accomplish anything at all. Repeatedly, he urged the banks to fund
SHI. Repeatedly, they refused. They would not loan the money unsecured
and unguaranteed, they declared, and the ﬁrm could not secure and the
shareholders would not guarantee.
Tsubouchieventuallydidgaincontrol,andSHIdidsurvive,butitsurvived
largely without banks and only on a reduced scale. From 79.7 billion yen
in March 1977, by 1979 it had cut its debt to 51.1 billion, by 1981 to 38.7
billion, and by 1983 to 10.2 billion. From 6968 employees in 1977, by 1979
it had cut its workforce to 4223, by 1981 to 3422, and by 1983 to 2760.
E. Other Cases
1. Hanasaki
Other distressed ﬁrms — even big ﬁrms — expeditiously go out of business.
In the early 1970s, with its forty-year history, the venerable Hanasaki ﬁrm
was one of the largest Japanese manufacturers of women’s clothing. When
it tried to expand in 1976, it found itself with enormous unsold inventory:
1.6 to 1.7 billion yen on annual sales of 18.5 billion.
"We begged itseveraltimesto come up withaconsolidated rationalization
plan, and a plan to rebuild," recalled one Sumitomo Bank representative.34
"But it wouldn’t comply." So, when in October it saw Hanasaki’s winter
clothes moving slowly, the bank offset 200 million yen’s worth of Hanasaki
liabilities against Hanasaki’s deposits. Early the next year it announced that
"therearelimitstoabank’sassistance"anddeclaredanendtoallfurtherloans.
Promptly, Hanasakiwent out ofbusiness.
2. Hayashi Spinning
Sometimes a rescue succeeds, but only after creditors manipulate the
bankruptcy process to oust the incumbents. The Hayashi ﬁrm had been
one of the largest wool spinning ﬁrms in Japan. When business worsened
in 1977, the founder-president resigned. As his family had earlier pledged
their stock in Hayashi Spinning to the Tokai Bank in exchange for its aid,
they now sued to retrieve that stock.
Soon, rumors began to circulate that the family would liquidate the ﬁrm
at the February shareholders meeting. Apparently, they planned to use their
equity stake to demand concessions from their creditors. Afraid of losing
34 Apareru sangyo "shissoku" [Apparel Industry Nose Dives], Shukan toyo keizai, May
13, 1978, at 80.
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control, the Tokai Bank immediately ﬁled for reorganization under the
bankruptcy laws. Through the bankruptcy proceeding, the bank was able
to cut the incumbent shareholders’ interests to less than 10% of the ﬁrm’s
stock. It then reorganized and revamped the ﬁrm. The factories continued to
operate with the labor force uncut — but now under bank control.
3. Mitsumi Electrical
And sometimes if banks try to intervene, the ﬁrms reject the banks and
restructure on their own. Electrical-parts maker Mitsumi had fallen on hard
times in 1970 after issuing bearer securities in Germany the previous year. In
1971 the Mitsui Bank35 sent in one of its men as Mitsumi vice-president and
anotherasdirector— this in addition to the Mitsui banker already on the ten-
member board. As of early 1970, the Mitsui Bank, Mitsumi’s fourth-largest
creditor, had lent Mitsumi 340million yen.By 1972 it was its largestcreditor
and had 635 million yen outstanding.
Within a year the Mitsui ofﬁcers had largely disappeared. The vice-
president had become an ordinary director, and the other directors had
vanished. Apparently, the incumbent managers — still under the control of
an autocratic CEO — had fought the bankers and pushed them out. Where
Mitsumi had had 3528 employees in January 1971, three years later it was
down to 2002 employees. It survived, but for several years only on a much
reduced scale.
III. EMPIRICS
Nothing about these accounts will surprise readers, except perhaps the fact
that they concern Japan. The tales hinge on predictable conﬂicts of interest
among creditors, shareholders, and managers, and those participants respond
to the predictable conﬂicts in predictable ways. Japanese banks and ﬁrms,
the tales imply, behave by the same logic as banks and ﬁrms in the West. Yet
anecdotes never end debates, and to explore more fully the role of conﬂicts
of interest in Japanese business we turn to more systematic evidence.
A. Data
We use two lists of troubled ﬁrms. Our ﬁrst roster (the 1978 ﬁrms) dates
from the mid-1970s. As the examples above suggest, for Japan these were
35 The similarity in names is coincidental. Mitsui and Mitsumi are not related.
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badly troubled years. The 1974 oil crisis had thrown a steadily and rapidly
growing economy into recession, and by 1978, a wide variety of ﬁrms were
under water. For this list, we take all 320 exchange-listed ﬁrms with a
loss carryforward in 1978. We obtain the list from the April 1978 issue of
the monthly journal Toyo keizai tokei geppo. None of the ﬁrms was in the
ﬁnancial services industry.
Oursecondlist(the1984ﬁrms)datesfromtheﬁrsthalfofthenextdecade.
As the massive late-1980s boom illustrates, these were healthier times for
the economy as a whole. Nonetheless, the health was not uniform. Troubled
ﬁrms remained, and for this second list, we take all 134 exchange-listed
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with at least three consecutive loss years (after interest
but before extraordinary gains and losses) as of April 1984. We obtain the
list from the August 11, 1984, issue of the weekly magazine Shukan toyo
keizai.
The Japanese government gradually deregulated aspects of the ﬁnancial
services industry in the late 1980s. Some observers argue that this radically
changed the "main bank system." In fact, as we show elsewhere, it did
not. Because the regulations involved had not constrained bank-ﬁrm lending
even in the 1960s,36theirrelaxationcouldnothavesigniﬁcantlyaffectedloan
patterns. For our purposes, however, note that the 1978 dataset antedates any
deregulation-inducedchanges tothe system,andeven the1984 listantedated
most ofthe changes.
We use the basic ﬁnancial information that appears in the cited issues
of the Toyo keizai tokei geppo and Shukan toyo keizai. We add board
composition from the annual Kigyo keiretsu soran volume and stock price
data from Toyo keizai kabuka CD-ROM database. Given both that the two
lists represent different variations on ﬁnancial distress and that the two
journals provide different information on the ﬁrms, we switch between the
two datasets as necessary.
As of 1978, there were 1584 exchange-listed ﬁrms in Japan. As of 1984,
there were 1646.
B. Variables
For our regressions, we deﬁne the following variables. We include selected
summary statistics in Table 2, below:
36 Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 6; Miwa & Ramseyer, Financial Malaise, supra note
2; Miwa & Ramseyer, Relationship Banking, supra note 2.
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Main Bank Loan Share: the fraction (in percent) of a ﬁrm’s total bank
loans borrowed from the bank lending the greatest amount to the ﬁrm.
Main Bank Experience Director: if followed by "no.," the number of
directors at the ﬁrm with experience working at the bank lending the greatest
amount to the ﬁrm; if followed by "dum.," a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the ﬁrm has any such directors.37
Any Bank Experience Director: if followed by "no.," the number of
directors at the ﬁrm with experience working at any bank; if followed by
"dum.," a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has any such directors.
Dominant Shareholder: a dummy variable equal to 1 if any shareholder
holds 25% or more of the ﬁrm’s stock.
Total Bank Loans: the amount of a ﬁrm’s bank loans, in million yen.
Total Main Bank Loans: the amount of a ﬁrm’s loans from the bank
lending the greatest amount to the ﬁrm, in million yen.
Table 2: Selected Summary Statistics
n Min. Mean Max.
A. 1978 Troubled Firms:
MB Loan Share 77 324 1 24.710 91.9
MB Exper Director 78 323 0 .703 7
Any Bank Exper Dir 78 323 0 1.217 7
Dominant S/h 78 323 0 .390 1
Total Bank Loans 77 320 28 18559 236671
B. 1984 Troubled Firms:
MB Loan Share 84 129 5.794 28.736 100
MB Exper Director 84 131 0 .855 4
Any Bank Exper Dir 84 131 0 1.489 9
Dominant S/h 84 131 0 .389 1
Total Bank Loans 84 131 0 39775 509676
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
37 For details on the determination of board composition, see Miwa & Ramseyer,
Outside Directors, supra note 2; Miwa & Ramseyer, Relationship Banking, supra
note 2.
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C. Preliminary Observations
1. Industry Mix
The ﬁrms in the two lists represent a variety of industries. The 324 1978
ﬁrms most commonly came from the machinery industry — 14.8% (48
ﬁrms). The textile industry followed with 13.6% (44 ﬁrms); the chemical
industry with 9.0% (29 ﬁrms); and the steel industry with 8.6% (28 ﬁrms).
Of the 1584 total listed ﬁrms that year, 10.3% were in machinery, 5.4% in
textiles, 10.4% in chemicals, and 4.0% in steel.
By 1984, the industry mix had shifted a bit, but only a bit. Of the 134
troubled 1984 ﬁrms, 15.7% were in textiles (21 ﬁrms). The trading industry
followed with 13.4% (18 ﬁrms); steel with 12.7% (17 ﬁrms); and chemicals
with 11.9% (16 ﬁrms). Seventy of these ﬁrms had suffered three consecutive
loss years; 26 ﬁrms had had four; and 38 ﬁrms had had ﬁve or more.
2. 1984 Firms: Subsequent Performance
As a crude measure (we make no adjustments for stock splits or dividends)
of how the market gauged the performance of troubled ﬁrms, consider the
stock price of the 1984 ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, consider the stock price
trajectory of the 101 1984 troubled ﬁrms that survived to 2001.38 In Figure
1, below, we partition our 1984 database into those ﬁrms whose stock traded
above the group median in 1984 and those those stock traded below. Wethen
index pricesat1984=100andcomparethe averagepriceofthe two groups of
ﬁrms with that of the market index ("TOPIX"). According to the Figure, the
below-averageﬁrmsbegantolagthemarketintheearly1970s.Althoughboth
groups of ﬁrms continued broadly to track the market as a whole, the lowest
performers initially recovered after 1984 — doing well during the so-called
"bubble economy" of the late 1980s. Their recovery did not last. By the end
of thecentury, bothgroupsunderperformedTOPIX.
To gauge the performance of these ﬁrms (indexed again at 1984=100)
more readily against the market index, in Figure 2, below, we reset TOPIX
at 100 for each year and calculate the distance between the index and the
stock prices of the two groups. The Figure conveys two simple messages.
First, the market did not expect anyone to rescue these ﬁrms. Erratically to
be sure, they underperformed the market from 1970 to 1984. Recall that
they had suffered at least three consecutive loss years by 1984. If the market
38 As of late 2001, one, Koma Stadium, had a stock price in the 8800 yen range (the
price of the others totaled 14,733), so we exclude it from our database.
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had expected someone to rescue them, their stock would not steadily have
underperformed the index. In fact, it did underperform the index.
Second, the market was right: no one did rescue them.39 Even after
1984, these firms continued to underperform. Their main banks did not
rescue them, even though they took more directors from their main bank
than other large firms: among large TSE firms as a whole, the mean firm
appointed.67directorsfromitsmainbank;40amongthetroubled1984firms,
themeanfirmappointed.88.Neitherdidtheirdominantshareholdersrescue
them,eventhoughtheytendedtohave suchshareholders:amonglargeTSE
firms, 20% had a dominant shareholder; among the troubled 1984 firms,
37%did.
Figure 1: Firms Partitioned by 1984 Stock Prices,
with Market Index, 1984 = 100
Notes: Firms are those in the 1984 database, as described in the text. They are partitioned
by whether they were above or below the median stock price in 1984 for the group still
listed in 2001. The Figure gives the mean price for the ﬁrms in the group as of the end
of each year, indexed at 1984=100.
39 Though their continued fall against the index is a puzzle — and a phenomenon one
would not expect in a rational market.
40 Among the approximately 1000 ﬁrms trading on Section 1 of the TSE in 1985.
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Figure 2: Firms Partitioned by 1984 Stock Prices,
Movement Relative to Market Index
Notes: Firms are those in the 1984 database, as described in the text. They are partitioned by
whether they were above or below the median stock price in 1984 for the group still listed in
2001. The Figure takes the stock price of the two groups of ﬁrms, indexes it at 1984=100, and
then calculates the distance between that price and the indexed TOPIX (here, shown at 100 for
each year).
3. 1978 Firms: Composition
To illustrate several closely related points, in Figures 3 and 4, below, we turn
to our database of 1978 troubled ﬁrms and partition it by several variables.
In Figure 3, we catalog the ﬁrms, ﬁrst, by whether they were insolvent,
then, by whether they had a dominant shareholder and whether they had any
directors from their main bank. Finally, we give the number of ﬁrms in each
category that disappeared by or survived to 1990. Of the 324 ﬁrms in our
sample, for instance, 87 were insolvent in 1978, and among those 87 ﬁrms,
43 had a dominant shareholder. Of those 43, thirteen had a director from
their main bank, and of the thirteen ﬁrms, six survived to 1990, while seven
disappeared. In Figure 4, we similarly partition the database by whether the
ﬁrms had a dominant shareholder, whether they changed their main bank
afﬁliation during the preceding three years, whether they disappeared by
1990, and whether they were insolvent in 1978.
Two points stand out. First, neither dominant shareholders nor main bank
directors necessarily keep ﬁrms solvent. Like the 1984 ﬁrms, many of the
insolvent 1978 ﬁrms had a dominant shareholder (43 of the 87 ﬁrms) and
many had directors from their main bank (35 of the ﬁrms). Second, neither
such shareholders nor such directors necessarily keep troubled ﬁrms alive.
Of the 64 ﬁrms that disappeared by 1990, 31 had had a dominant shareholder
and 30 had had a main bank director.
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For reference, in Table 3 (below) weadd loan information aboutseveral of
the groups of partitioned ﬁrms. We give the partitioning along the left-hand
column.Wethenfollowthatwiththe numberof ﬁrmsineachgroup;withthe
mean per ﬁrm loan amount (in millions of yen) in 1974; with the fractional
increase to 1977; with analogous information on the mean per ﬁrm loans
from each ﬁrm’s main bank; and with the mean share of loans each ﬁrm
obtains from its main bank.
Whatever story the data tell, they do not tell a story about main bank
rescues. Granted, the main banks did lend to troubled ﬁrms. From 1974 to
1979, they increased their loans to the solvent ﬁrms by 59%, but to the
insolvent by 87%. Yet they increased the loans less than the other banks
did. During the same period, the main banks’ loan share at the solvent ﬁrms
rose by 1%, while at the insolvent ﬁrms it fell. What is more, by lending,
the main banks did not save. Among the insolvent ﬁrms, the main banks
increased their loans to the ﬁrms that survived by 66%. To the ﬁrms that
disappeared by 1990, they increased their loans by 116%.
Figure 3: Composition of 1978 Database by Solvency
No. ﬁrms No. ﬁrms w/ No. ﬁrms w/ No. ﬁrms No. ﬁrms
All insolvent dominant s/h MB director disappearing surviving
yes (13) 7 6
yes (43)
no (30) 10 20
yes (87)
yes (22) 14 8
no (44)
no (22) 9 13
324
yes (33) 5 28
yes (96)
no (63) 9 54
no (237)
yes (69) 4 65
no (141)
no (72) 6 66
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: 1978 troubled ﬁrms, partitioned by whether they were insolvent, had a dominant
shareholder, had a main bank director, and disappeared by or survived to 1990.
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Figure 4: Composition of 1978 Database by Presence of
Dominant Shareholder
No. ﬁrms w/ No. ﬁrms w/ No. ﬁrms No. ﬁrms
All dominant s/h MB change gone by 90 insolvent 78
yes (8)
yes (10)
no (2)
yes (41)
yes (12)
no (31)
no (19)
yes (139)
yes (9)
yes (21)
no (12)
no (98)
yes (14)
no (77)
no (63)
324
yes (4)
yes (7)
no (3)
yes (36)
yes (8)
no (29)
no (21)
no (185)
yes (19)
yes (26)
no (7)
no (149)
yes (13)
no (123)
no (110)
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: 1978 troubled ﬁrms, partitioned by whether they had a dominant shareholder,
had changed their main bank afﬁliation during the three preceding years, disappeared
by 1990, and were insolvent in 1978.
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Table 3: Loans to Firms in 1978 Data Base
No.
Firms
74 Tot
Loan(*)
77 Tot Ln
Indexed(**)
74 MB
Loan
77 MB Ln.
Indexed
74 Loan
Share(A)
77 Loan
Share(B)
A-B
all 324 13,295 140 2,223 164 24.2 24.7 0.5
Insolvent 87 6,915 149 1,439 187 27.4 26.5 -0.9
Had Dominant S/h in 1975 43 5,018 159 968 175 24.8 19.9 -4.9
Had MB Exper. Director 13 7,267 134 1,699 196 29.4 30.1 0.7
No MB Exper. Director 30 4,009 179 641 153 22.7 15.4 -7.3
No Dominant S/h in 1975 44 8,726 143 1,889 195 29.9 32.9 3.0
Had MB Exper. Director 22 10,693 138 2,442 180 31.8 38.8 7.0
No MB Exper. Director 22 6,759 152 1,336 222 28.0 27.0 -1.0
Solvent 237 15,639 138 2,511 159 23.1 24.1 1.0
Had Dominant S/h in 1975 96 12,266 154 2,089 171 22.5 21.4 -1.1
Had MB Exper. Director 33 20,983 151 3,486 153 25.2 23.4 -1.8
No MB Exper. Director 63 7,700 159 1,357 194 21.0 20.3 -0.7
No Dominant S/h in 1975 141 17,986 130 2,804 153 23.5 25.9 2.4
Had MB Exper. Director 69 20,667 127 3,476 159 23.8 27.7 3.9
No MB Exper. Director 72 15,455 135 2,170 144 23.2 24.2 1.0
Had MB Exper. Director 137 17,829 135 3,139 162 26.0 28.7 2.7
Had MB change 21 14,003 137 2,372 147 20.4 20.5 0.1
No MB change 116 18,533 135 3,280 164 27.0 30.2 3.2
No MB Exper. Director 187 9,986 145 1,554 167 23.0 21.8 -1.2
MB change 56 7,401 124 819 156 20.0 18.5 -1.5
No MB change 131 11,108 152 1,874 169 24.3 23.2 -1.1
Insolvent
disappeared by 1990 40 5,776 165 1,352 216 30.6 31.5 0.9
by 1978 24 7,650 150 1,687 221 28.8 29.1 0.3
during 1978-1990 16 2,778 229 816 209 33.4 35.2 1.8
alive in 1990 47 7,860 139 1,512 166 24.7 22.2 -2.5
Solvent
disappeared by 1990 24 18,534 125 2,323 159 22.3 19.7 -2.6
by 1978 9 22,977 129 3,093 186 23.0 20.5 -2.5
in 1978-1990 15 15,678 122 1,828 135 21.9 19.2 -2.7
alive in 1990 213 15,324 140 2,531 159 23.2 24.6 1.4
MB change 77 9,202 129 1,243 151 20.1 19.0 -1.1
No MB change 247 14,591 142 2,533 166 25.5 26.5 1.0
Had Dominant S/h in 1975 139 10,060 155 1,748 171 23.2 20.9 -2.3
No Dominant S/h in 1975 185 15,747 132 2,583 161 25.0 27.6 2.6
(*) million yen
(**) 1974=100
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4. Testable Hypotheses
Nonetheless, according to most Japan "experts," main banks do implicitly
agree to rescue troubled borrowers. Typically, the experts claim that the
banks rescue by lending the ﬁrms funds they otherwise would not lend.
Even when a loan is not otherwise ﬁnancially advantageous, main banks
lend.
From this, several testable implications follow:
a) Firm failures. Very few listed ﬁrms will fail. If all (or most) large ﬁrms
have a main bank and main banks agree to rescue their distressed borrowers,
then few large ﬁrms should disappear.
If (as occasionally claimed in the literature) the presence of directors from
a ﬁrm’s main bank (or the fraction of its loans from the main bank) proxies
for the strength of the ﬁrm’s ties with its main bank, then ﬁrms with more
directors from their main bank (or borrowing more from their main bank)
should be less likely to fail than other ﬁrms.
b) Main bank loan share. When ﬁnancially troubled, ﬁrms will borrow
heavily from their main bank. Banks do not all agree to rescue borrowers.
Rather, only main banks do. If so, then the fraction of a ﬁrm’s loans coming
from the main bank should rise during times of ﬁnancial distress.
If the presence of directors from a ﬁrm’s main bank (or the fraction of its
loans from the main bank) proxies for the strength of a distressed ﬁrm’s ties
with its main bank, then the fraction of a ﬁrm’s loans coming from the main
bank will rise most dramatically at ﬁrms with more directors from their
main bank (or with a greater fraction of their loans from their main bank).
c) Total loans. Firms will continue to borrow during times of distress.
Either the main bank will itself lend the troubled ﬁrm the funds it needs
(the most common conventional hypothesis), or by implicitly guaranteeing
the ﬁrm’s debts, it will facilitate loans elsewhere (an occasional alternative
hypothesis).
d) Main bank switch rates. The most troubled ﬁrms will rarely switch
their main bank afﬁliation. Holding an implicit insurance contract from
their main bank, the more seriously troubled ﬁrms will seldom abandon the
relationship.
D. Bank Rescues
1. Firm Failures
Firms fail in Japan, even big exchange-listed ﬁrms. The notion that main
banks save all large troubled ﬁrms is simply false. Of the troubled ﬁrms
in 1978, 10.3% vanished immediately and 20.9% had not recovered six
years later: i.e., 33 ﬁrms disappeared within a year and 67 remained
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sufﬁciently underperforming to appear on the 1984 list. Of the ﬁrms that
disappeared,14disappearedbymerger,9throughvariousbankruptcy-related
legal proceedings, and 10 simply delisted (not all delisted ﬁrms failed, of
course).
In Table 4, we explore some of the possible determinants of firm failure.
Toward that end, we use the 1984 sample and regress on several variables
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was still listed on the TSE in
late 2001. Because the conventional wisdom does not specify when strong
main-bank ties most matter, we use as our independent variables not just
(i) those from 1984 (col. 3), but (ii) those from the years before the onset
of distress (1978 and 1981, cols. 1 & 2) and (iii) those from the years after
the distress (1987, col. 4) as well.
According to the literature, the stronger a main bank’s ties to a firm, the
more likely the bank will save the firm. In fact, according to Table 4, the
more a firm depended on its main bank for its debt in 1984 or 1987 (the
higher was Main Bank Loan Share), the lower the odds that it would
still exist in 2001. The number of potential main bank representatives
on the firm’s board (Main Bank Experience Director) and the presence
of a dominant shareholder (Dominant Shareholder) had no observable
relation to the odds that the firm would survive.
If main-bank-tied firms tended to disappear, might they have
disappeared because the main bank "rescued" them through a merger?
In Table 5, we take the disappeared firms and regress on the same
variables a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was a party to a merger.
Again, we compare the results obtained with independent variables from
four separate years. Once more, the strength of a firm’s ties to its main
bank shows no observable connection to the possibility of merger. If main
banks engineer mergers, it does not appear in the data.
In fact, the distinction between a liquidation and a merger is a distinction
without substance anyway. On the one hand, that a ﬁrm is liquidated says
nothing about what happens to its assets or employees. If its assets have
economic value, another ﬁrm will buy and use them. If its employees have
skills speciﬁc to those assets, then the ﬁrm that buys the assets will have an
incentive to hire the employees as well. On the other hand, that a ﬁrm is
merged likewise says nothing about what happens to its assets or employees.
If the acquiring ﬁrm cannot use the merged ﬁrm’s assets as productively as
another ﬁrm could, it will sell them. If it does not ﬁnd the merged ﬁrm’s
employees cost-effective, it will discharge them. Fundamentally, whether a
ﬁrm is liquidated or merged says nothing about what happens either to its
assets or to its employees.
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Table 4
Determinants of Survival: Probit Regression Results
Dependent Variable: TSE Listed in 2001
Independent Variables From –
1978 1981 1984 1987
MB Loan Share –.010 (1.17) –.014 (1.71) –.015 (2.22) –.024 (3.04)
MB Exper. Director (no.) –.095 (0.78) .141 (1.16) –.060 (0.54) –.116 (0.74)
Dominant S/h –.118 (0.44) .040 (0.16) .079 (0.29) –.118 (0.44)
Total Bank Loans (x104) –.025 (1.31) –.030 (2.15) .027 (1.78) –.013 (1.00)
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.00
n 131 132 129 121
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: The data set is the 1984 ﬁrms, as explained in the text. In each case, we give the
coefﬁcients, followed by the absolute value of the z-statistics (calculated with robust
standard errors) in parentheses. The regressions include a constant term, not reported
here.
Table 5
Determinants of Merger: Probit Regression Results —
Disappearing Firms Only
Dependent Variable: Disappeared Through Merger
Independent Variables From –
1978 1981 1984 1987
MB Loan Share .005 (0.37) –.014 (1.27) –.005 (0.47) .018 (1.13)
MB Exper. Director (no.) .636 (1.37) .751 (1.78) .433 (1.46) –.289 (0.50)
Dominant S/h 1.200 (1.74) 1.341 (1.80) 1.272 (1.64) .960 (1.26)
Total Bank Loans (x104) .060 (1.71) .041 (1.02) .033 (1.22) .000 (1.51)
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.18
n 3 23 32 92 0
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: The data set is the 1984 firms, as explained in the text. In each case, we give
the coefficients, followed by the absolute value of the z-statistics (calculated with robust
standard errors) in parentheses. The regressions include a constant term, not reported here.
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2. Main Bank Loan Share
a) 1978 ﬁrms.According to theconventionalaccounts, inimplicitly agreeing
to rescue troubled ﬁrms the main bank promises to lend the ﬁrms additional
funds as necessary. By contrast, the 1978 data show no willingness on the
part of the main banks to shoulder any substantial additional part of the
loans to the troubled ﬁrms. In 1974, the main banks in the dataset had lent
an average of 24.2% of the debt of the ﬁrms involved. By 1977, that fraction
had risen — but only to 24.7%.
Even thatevidence misleads, for atthe mostseriouslytroubled1978ﬁrms,
the main banks dramatically cut their exposure. Among the 324 troubled
1978 ﬁrms, 87 (26.9%) were insolvent. From 1974 to 1977, the main banks
reduced the amount they lent to 19 of the insolvent ﬁrms (21.8%). They cut
the fraction of the insolvent ﬁrms’ loans they were willing to ﬁnance at 44
(50.6%)
b) 1984 ﬁrms. To see the phenomenon more clearly, consider Table 6,
below. There, we trace the loan patterns at the ﬁrms in the 1984 dataset
during the years before and after 1984. In the ﬁrst line of each panel, we give
the relevant ﬁgures for the dataset as a whole. In the next lines, we partition
the dataset by the size of a ﬁrm’s borrowings and include the relevant ﬁgures
for each subset (see the notes to the Table for the partitioning standards).
Largely for informational purposes, in Panel A we give the per-ﬁrm average
total bank loans, in Panel B the per-ﬁrm average growth in bank loans, and
in Panel C the per-ﬁrm average main bank loans.
Note that the per-firm mean figures of Panels B and C will sometimes
reflect outlying data points caused by events that have nothing to do
with bank rescues. If a large firm merges with another, for example, it
may increase the mean per-firm borrowing (as when Maruzen Oil merged
with Daikyo Oil during the 1984-87 period — both were in the largest
quartile). If a firm buys another firm and borrows heavily to build the new
business, it may similarly increase the mean (as when the Daiei general
merchandising store bought Maruko and expanded it into Daiei Finance
during 1987-90).
In any event, consider Panel D, where we trace the change in the
distribution of bank loans between the firms’ main banks and the other
banks. During the 1970s, these firms had borrowed 18% to 20% of their
funds from their main banks. As they hit hard times in the early 1980s, the
main banks cut the amounts they lent them. From 18.1% in 1981, by 1983
and 1984 they reduced the amounts they shouldered to under 17%. Only
as the firms began to recover did the main banks increase the fraction
again (and note the cautionary results in Table 8).
Or turn to Table 7, where we give the number of ﬁrms (partitioned by
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loan size as in Table 6) at which the main bank raised or cut the fraction of
the ﬁrm’s debt it shouldered. Focus on the most troubled period for these
ﬁrms: 1981-84. Note that for the ﬁrms with the most outstanding debt, the
main banks raised the share they ﬁnanced at only 3 ﬁrms, but cut it at 10.
For the group with the second largest amount of debt, the main banks raised
their share at 17, but cut it at 23. Only with the next smaller-debt group did
they increase the share they ﬁnanced more often than they cut it, but then
only by 13 to 12.
Table 6: Bank Loans at the Troubled Firms
A. Total bank loans (per ﬁrm average):
1972 1978 1981 1983 1984 1987 1990 1996
All ﬁrms 16182 32055 37876 41870 39775 40153 38972 48608
By amount of bank debt
Very large 88730 191977 250569 271031 255853 266234 229873 273926
Large 14396 24914 24952 27497 26552 27088 25705 29946
Small 3528 6592 6224 7189 7202 10841 19069 35020
Very small 2096 3658 3021 2745 2562 3199 7008 10362
B. Per ﬁrm average growth in total bank loans (100+%):
1972-78 1978-84 1981-84 1984-87 1987-90 1990-96
All ﬁrms 198 124 105 101 97 125
By amount of bank debt
Very large 216 133 102 104 86 119
Large 173 107 106 102 95 116
Small 187 109 116 151 176 184
Very small 175 70 85 125 219 148
C. Total main bank loans (per ﬁrm average):
1972 1978 1981 1983 1984 1987 1990 1996
All ﬁrms 3219 5823 6874 7056 6692 7351 8021 9955
By amount of bank debt
Very large 12539 29394 39084 38514 36063 41613 43458 56535
Large 4440 5837 5906 5855 5561 6632 6092 6161
Small 1049 1563 1543 2015 2147 2335 2755 4952
Very small 508 967 891 979 943 1056 1523 2457
(cont.)
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Table 6: Bank Loans at the Troubled Firms (cont.)
D. Main bank loan share (%):
1972 1978 1981 1983 1984 1987 1990 1996
All ﬁrms 19.9 18.2 18.1 16.9 16.8 18.3 20.6 20.5
By amount of bank debt
Very large 14.1 15.3 15.6 14.2 14.1 15.6 18.9 20.6
Large 30.8 23.4 23.7 21.3 20.9 24.5 23.7 20.6
Small 29.7 23.7 24.8 28.0 29.8 21.5 14.4 14.1
Very small 24.2 26.4 29.5 35.7 36.8 33.0 21.7 23.7
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes:
* The ﬁrms are the 134 stock-exchange listed ﬁrms listed in the August 11, 1984, issue of
Shukan toyo keizai as having had negative after-interest proﬁts for three years in a row.
* Debt sizes: very large = ﬁrms with over 100 billion yen in bank debt as of March 1984
(15 ﬁrms); large = ﬁrms with 10-100 billion yen in bank debt (40 ﬁrms); small = ﬁrms with
5-10 billion yen in bank debt (25 ﬁrms); very small = ﬁrms with less than 5 billion yen in
bank debt (54 ﬁrms).
* The average main bank loan share is calculated from the group loan amounts as a whole,
rather than as an average of the per ﬁrm loan shares.
Table 7: Number of Firms with Increase or Decrease
in Main Bank Loan Share
1972-78 1978-81 1981-84 1984-87 1987-90 1990-96
VL group
Increase 6 8 3 10 9 8
Unchanged 2
Decrease 9 7 10 3 4 4
L group
Increase 15 23 17 22 24 21
Unchanged 1 2 1 1
Decrease 22 16 23 12 11 12
S group
Increase 9 14 13 12 12 14
Unchanged 1
Decrease 15 11 12 9 9 5
(cont.)
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Table 7: Number of Firms with Increase or Decrease
in Main Bank Loan Share (cont.)
1972-78 1978-81 1981-84 1984-87 1987-90 1990-96
VS group
Increase 33 31 27 27 18 28
Unchanged 2 3 1 1
Decrease 14 15 22 19 30 18
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: The ﬁrms are the 134 stock-exchange listed ﬁrms listed in the August 11, 1984, issue
of Shukan toyo keizai as having had negative after-interest proﬁts for three years in a row.
The ﬁrms are partitioned by debt size: very large = ﬁrms with over 100 billion yen in bank
debt as of March 1984 (15 ﬁrms); large = ﬁrms with 10-100 billion yen in bank debt (40
ﬁrms); small = ﬁrms with 5-10 billion yen in bank debt (25 ﬁrms); very small = ﬁrms with
less than 5 billion yen in bank debt (54 ﬁrms).
For each cell, we give the number of ﬁrms where the change in Main Bank Loan Share
increased, decreased, or remained unchanged during the period at issue.
c) OLS regressions. In Table 8, we use the 1984 data set to compare the
factors that contribute to increases in the share of a ﬁrm’s debt the main
bank ﬁnances during the periods before and after distress. Unfortunately,
the conventional literature does not specify when main-bank ties matter
most. As a result, we use data from four separate time windows. In Panel
A, we examine the period leading up to distress: we ﬁrst use the increase
in Main Bank Loan Share over 1981-84 as our dependent variable and
independent variables from 1981 and then pair the increase over 1978-84
with independent variables from 1978. In Panel B, we examine the period
after the distress: we take our independent variables from 1984 and use
as our dependent variable ﬁrst the Main Bank Loan Share increase over
1984-87 and then the increase over 1984-90.
For the first two columns of each panel of Table 8, we use as independent
variables either (i) the number of directors with experience at the main bank
or (ii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has any such director. For the
last two columns, we use either (x) the number of directors with experience at
any bank or (y) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has any such director.
Note that Main Bank Loan Share and Main Bank Experience Director are
not strongly correlated. Among the 67 firms with no ex-main-bank directors
in 1984, the average main bank loan share was 26.3%, while among the 62
firms with at least one ex-main-bank director it was 31.4%; the difference
between the two means is not significant at even the 10% level (two-tailed
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test). The correlation coefficient between Main Bank Loan Share and Main
Bank Experience Director (no.) for 1984 is 0.11.
By 1984, the ﬁrms in our sample already would have experienced at least
three consecutive loss years. A main bank that intended to rescue such a
ﬁrm should have begun to lend it extra funds by then. For that reason, we
focus on the years leading up to 1984 in Panel A of Table 8:41 changes in
a ﬁrm’s Main Bank Loan Share during the three or more loss years and
the years leading up to those years. Suppose, as often asserted, that (i) the
share of a ﬁrm’s debt a main bank ﬁnances and (ii) the number of directors
from the main bank on a ﬁrm’s board both proxy for the strength of the
ﬁrm’s ties to the main bank. Suppose further that bank rescues take the
form of loans by a main bank to a troubled ﬁrm that other banks would not
willingly make. If main banks rescue the troubled ﬁrms closest to them, then
these hypotheses imply that a ﬁrm’s Main Bank Loan Share and Main
Bank Experience Director will be positively associated with increases in
its Main Bank Loan Share as it enters troubled times.
According to Panel A, main banks do not rescue their troubled clients.
The coefﬁcients on Main Bank Loan Share are signiﬁcantly negative for
1978-84 and insigniﬁcant for 1981-84. The coefﬁcients on Main Bank
Experience Director are uniformly insigniﬁcant. If anything, the closer the
ties a ﬁrm maintains with its main bank, the more the bank will cut the share
of the ﬁrm’s debt it ﬁnances as the ﬁrm enters distress.
The results for Panel B present more of a puzzle. During the years
after distress, the ﬁrm’s Main Bank Loan Share continues to be negatively
associated with increases in that variable: in all speciﬁcations, the greater the
share of a ﬁrm’s debt the main bank ﬁnances, the more it cuts that exposure
during the years after distress. At ﬁrst glance, however, the coefﬁcient
on Main Bank Experience Director seems to support the bank-rescue
hypothesis: for both the 1984-87 and the 1984-90 periods, the coefﬁcient is
positive and weakly signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
We say "at first glance" because the result appears neither statistically
robust nor economically very large. Consider the first of the regression
results using 1984-87 data. Statistically, the significance here of the Main
Bank Experience Director variable hinges on the simultaneous inclusion
of Main Bank Loan Share. If we drop the latter, the t-statistic on the
41 Additionally, note that, by 1984, Japanese asset prices had begun to boom, raising
the value of mortgageable assets at most ﬁrms, lowering the default risk they
presented — and reducing the implication that any loan to a ﬁrm represented a
"rescue." Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, by 1984, the stock prices of the ﬁrms in this
sample had already begun to rise.
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director variable drops to 0.71. By contrast, Main Bank Loan Share
remains negative and significant regardless of whether we include Main
Bank Experience Director. Even if we drop the latter, the t-statistic on
the loan share variable stays at -2.64.
Economically, the number of main bank directors has relatively little
impact on the change in the main bank’s loan share over 1984-87. By the
conventional wisdom, a ﬁrm with close main bank ties would both borrow
a higher fraction of its debt from its main bank (larger Main Bank Loan
Share) and name more directors from its main bank (larger Main Bank
Experience Director). Yet according to Panel B, the negative coefﬁcient on
loan share more than offsets the positive coefﬁcient on the director variable.
To illustrate, compare a ﬁrm with median values for each of the relevant
variables in 1984 with a ﬁrm with stronger-than-median ties to its main
bank. The ﬁrm with median values for all variables would have found that
its predicted Main Bank Loan Share (given in percent) increased during
1984-87 by 3.571 percentage points.42 Now suppose this ﬁrm had stronger-
than-median main bank ties reﬂected in a 1984 Main Bank Experience
Director value one standard deviation above the median. Over 1984-87, its
predicted Main Bank Loan Share would have risen by an additional 2.121
points, for a predicted increase of (3.571 + 2.121 =) 5.692.
By contrast, however, suppose that our otherwise-median ﬁrm instead
had strong main bank ties reﬂected in a 1984 Main Bank Loan Share one
standard deviation above the median. Over 1984-87, its Main Bank Loan
Share shift would have lagged that of the median ﬁrm by 6.298 points.
Because the median ﬁrm had a predicted increase in its Main Bank Loan
Share of 3.571, our ﬁrm with strong main bank ties would have had a
predicted 1984-87 fall of (3.571 - 6.298 =) -2.727.
Finally, suppose that our ﬁrm had strong main bank ties reﬂected in loan
share and director values that both lay one standard deviation above the
median. Because the negative effect of the loan share variable more than
offsets the positive effect of the director variable, over 1984-87 this ﬁrm’s
Main Bank Loan Share would have lagged that of the median ﬁrm by
(6.298 - 2.121 =) 4.177. Given that the median ﬁrm had a predicted increase
of 3.571, our main-bank-tied ﬁrm would have had a predicted 1984-87 fall
of (3.571 - 4.177 =) -.606. Hence the conclusion: main banks do not try to
save the ﬁrms closest to them.
42 The mean increase in Main Bank Loan Share is 1.663 for 1981-84 and 1.495 for
1984-87. Neither is statistically signiﬁcantly different from 0.
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Table 8: Determinants of Main Bank Share Increase:
OLS Regression Results
A. Prior to Distress:
Dependent Variable: Main Bank Share Increase, 1981-1984 (n = 128)
81 MB Loan Share -.080 (0.63) -.072 (0.57) -.067 (0.55) -.051 (0.43)
81 MB Exper Dir (no.) .718 (0.56)
81 MB Exper Dir (dum.) .271 (0.10)
81 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) -.407 (0.87)
81 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) -3.396 (1.26)
81 Dominant S/h -2.973 (1.12) -3.183 (1.20) -3.484 (1.34) -3.973 (1.42)
81 Tot Bank Lns (x104) -.196 (2.02) -.168 (1.91) -.128 (1.62) -.118 (1.61)
R2 .03 .03 .03 .04
Dependent Variable: Main Bank Share Increase, 1978-1984 (n = 127)
78 MB Loan Share -.268 (2.75) -.229 (2.42) -.239 (2.58) -.230 (2.50)
78 MB Exper Dir (no.) 3.629 (1.40)
78 MB Exper Dir (dum.) -.284 (0.09)
78 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) 1.035 (0.64)
78 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) -.075 (0.02)
78 Dominant S/h -2.426 (0.98) -3.956 (1.65) -3.413 (1.42) -3.909 (1.51)
78 Tot Bank Lns (x104) -.495 (2.95) -.368 (2.43) -.478 (2.06) -.372 (2.64)
R2 .12 .07 .08 .07
B. After distress:
Dependent Variable: Main Bank Share Increase, 1984-1987 (n = 119)
84 MB Loan Share -.326 (2.80) -.320 (2.72) -.305 (2.62) -.307 (2.61)
84 MB Exper Dir (no.) 1.894 (1.85)
84 MB Exper Dir (dum.) 3.236 (1.55)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) .189 (0.33)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) .890 (0.42)
84 Dominant S/h -2.358 (1.18) -2.822 (1.37) -3.382 (1.55) -3.286 (1.56)
84 Tot Bank Lns (x104) -.306 (2.54) -.272 (2.54) -.243 (2.09) -.237 (2.34)
R2 .26 .25 .24 .24
Dependent Variable: Main Bank Share Increase, 1984-1990 (n = 118)
84 MB Loan Share 84 -.702 (4.08) -.698 (4.17) -.672 (4.04) -.676 (4.05)
84 MB Exper Dir (no.) 3.275 (1.97)
84 MB Exper Dir (dum.) 7.260 (1.97)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) 1.229 (1.15)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) 4.424 (1.22)
84 Dominant S/h -1.180 (0.36) -1.637 (0.49) -2.226 (0.63) -1.998 (0.57)
84 Tot Bank Lns (x104) -.393 (2.04) -.357 (2.14) -.358 (1.82) -.307 (1.90)
R2 .38 .38 .36 .36
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: The data set is comprised of the 1984 ﬁrms, as explained in the text. In each case,
we give the coefﬁcients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistics (calculated using
OLS with robust standard errors) in parentheses. The regressions include a constant term,
not reported here.
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d) Total bank loans. Faced with evidence that main banks do not increase
their debt share at distressed ﬁrms, readers may suggest that main banks
nonetheless help ﬁrms by inducing other banks to loan funds they otherwise
would not lend. During their 1981-84 loss years, these troubled ﬁrms did
increase their debt by 5%. During the next three years (1984-87), they
increased it by only 1%, however, and during the height of the 1987-90
economic boom, they actually cut their debt (Table 6, Panel B).
TSE-listed ﬁrms as a whole increased their loans far more aggressively.
During 1980-85, they increased the amounts they borrowed by 61% and,
during 1986-90, by another 98%. As noted earlier, the distressed ﬁrms were
most commonly in the machinery, textiles, chemicals, steel, and trading
industries. In these industries (textiles fall within light industry and steel
within metals), the TSE ﬁrms raised their bank loans by the following
fractions:43
Machinery Light Ind. Chemicals Metals Trading
1980-85: 22% 101% 23% 101% 142%
1986-90: 84% 72% 25% 142% 335%
Now consider Table 9, where we regress the increase in total loans
(in percent) before and after the 1984 distress on the same independent
variables. The only signiﬁcant result concerns the number of directors with
banking experience: the greater the number of such directors before the
onset of distress, the lower the growth in a ﬁrm’s total loans during the
ensuing years (Panel A). The point relevant here, however, is simpler: the
results show no evidence that strong main bank ties (whether by the main
bank’s share of the ﬁrm’s loans or by its personnel on the ﬁrm’s board)
increase a ﬁrm’s ability to borrow either before or after the onset of distress.
Summarymeasuresconﬁrmtheabsenceofanymechanismbywhichmain
bank afﬁliation raises total loans. Of the 131 ﬁrms in our 1984 database with
below-median Main Bank Loan Share in 1981, the amount of outstanding
loans fell during 1981-84 at 13; of the ﬁrms with above-median Main Bank
Loan Share, outstanding loans fell at 23. Of the ﬁrms with a below-median
number of Main Bank Experience Directors in 1981, the amount of
outstanding loans fell during 1981-84 at 18; of those with above-median
Main Bank Experience Directors, outstanding loans similarly fell at 18.
43 Based on the database constructed for Miwa & Ramseyer, Relationship Banking,
supra note 2.
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Table 9: Determinants of Total Loan Increase: OLS Regression Results
A. Prior to Distress:
Dependent Variable: Total Loan Increase, 1981-1984 (n = 129)
81 MB Loan Share .548 (1.35) .567 (1.39) .516 (1.34) .578 (1.47)
81 MB Exper Dir (no.) -4.254 (0.91)
81 MB Exper Dir (dum.) -11.450 (1.12)
81 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) -4.005 (2.08)
81 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) -16.501 (1.56)
81 Dominant S/h 14.745 (1.40) 15.111 (1.44) 13.514 (1.32) 12.608 (1.18)
81 Tot Bank Lns (x103) -.025 (0.77) -.025 (0.85) -.010 (0.31) -.022 (0.79)
R2 .07 .08 .09 .09
Dependent Variable: Total Loan Increase, 1978-1984 (n = 128)
78 MB Loan Share 1.056 (1.11) 1.018 (1.09) 1.096 (1.17) 1.039 (1.11)
78 MB Exper Dir (no.) -3.522 (0.52)
78 MB Exper Dir (dum.) .464 (0.03)
78 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) -9.283 (2.24)
78 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) -6.772 (0.49)
78 Dominant S/h 16.454 (1.20) 17.943 (1.30) 13.590 (1.04) 15.916 (1.13)
78 Tot Bank Lns (x103) .065 (0.92) .052 (0.73) .147 (1.88) .065 (0.95)
R2 .05 .05 .08 .06
B. After Distress:
Dependent Variable: Total Loan Increase, 1984-1987 (n = 120)
84 MB Loan Share .734 (0.79) .795 (0.88) .742 (0.83) .780 (0.88)
84 MB Exper Dir (no.) -.906 (0.13)
84 MB Exper Dir (dum.) -14.612 (0.84)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) -2.427 (0.61)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) -18.303 (0.87)
84 Dominant S/h 34.795 (1.32) 32.101 (1.26) 33.390 (1.27) 30.275 (1.28)
84 Tot Bank Lns (x103) .082 (0.82) .099 (1.03) .099 (1.00) .093 (1.07)
R2 .03 .03 .03 .03
Dependent Variable: Total Loan Increase, 1984-1990 (n = 119)
84 MB Loan Share 7.402 (0.95) 7.658 (0.98) 6.965 (0.94) 7.385 (0.97)
84 MB Exper Dir (no.)-56.786 (1.15)
84 MB Exper Dir (dum.) -192.754 (1.35)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (no.) -33.083 (1.29)
84 Any Bk Exp Dir (dum.) -216.075 (1.37)
84 Dominant S/h 248.885 (1.53) 241.822 (1.51) 257.933 (1.50) 224.075 (1.51)
84 Tot Bank Lns (x103) .539 (0.86) .569 (0.93) .576 (0.94) .546 (0.93)
R2 .06 .07 .06 .07
Sources: Toyo keizai tokei geppo, Apr. 1978; Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984; Kigyo
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Toyo keizai ed., as updated).
Notes: The data set is comprised of the 1984 ﬁrms, as explained in the text. In each case,
we give the coefﬁcients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistics (calculated using
OLS with robust standard errors) in parentheses. The regressions include a constant term,
not reported here.
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e)Mainbankswitchrates.Ifmainbanksofferedimplicitinsuranceagainst
distress, then those ﬁrms closest to insolvency should maintain the most
stable main bank relationships. Healthy thirty-ﬁve-year-olds do, after all,
sometimes switch their life insurance policies. Terminally-ill eighty-year-
olds do not. By hypothesis, the distressed ﬁrm has paid the bank its implicit
insurance premia for years. At the very time at which it might collect on
that policy, it will not cancel the policy and search for another carrier.
If distressed firms do switch main banks, they do so either because the main
bank already reneged on its implicit insurance coverage or because it never
offered it in the first place. And if main banks regularly renege, of course,
no rational firm will pay the premia, while if firms do not pay the premia,
no rational bank will offer the insurance. If distressed firms regularly switch
main banks, firms and banks must not be contracting for insurance.
Firms do indeed switch. If anything (the difference is modest), distressed
ﬁrms switch more readily than healthier ﬁrms. Of the ﬁrms in the 1978
database, 77 (24.1%) had switched their main bank during the preceding
three years. Among the 87 insolvent ﬁrms in the group, 32 (36.8%) had
switched. Among TSE ﬁrms as a whole, 29.2% changed their main bank
afﬁliation during 1980-85; 20.8% changed during 1986-90. Among the ﬁrms
in the bottom proﬁtability decile, 29.8% changed their main bank during the
ﬁrst half of the decade; 26.3% changed during the second.
f) Dominant shareholders. According to the corporate governance
literature, the presence of a dominant shareholder will mitigate the conﬂict
of interest between managers and shareholders. To be sure, a dominant
shareholder may aggravate the conﬂict among the shareholders or between
shareholders and creditors. Yet he should generally reduce the conﬂict
between shareholders and managers and, in so doing, should raise ﬁrm
performance.
So theory suggests. Yet our troubled ﬁrms include disproportionately
many with a dominant shareholder. Among TSE Section 1 ﬁrms as a
whole, 20.3% had a dominant (25% or more) shareholder in 1980 and
20.4% in 1985. Among our troubled 1978 ﬁrms, 39.0% had a dominant
shareholder (1977 data), while among our troubled 1984 ﬁrms 38.9% did
(1984 data). Among the 87 insolvent ﬁrms in our 1978 database, 43 had a
dominant shareholder, of which only 26 survived to 1990. At least in this
sample, dominant shareholders seem unable to raise ﬁrm performance. Yet
according to main bank theorists, what dominant shareholders cannot do
banks routinely perform.
Return to Tables 8 and 9, where we ask whether dominant shareholders
facilitated loans. Our account of the travails of Sasebo Heavy Industries
suggeststhatdominantshareholdersmightdosobyguaranteeingthetroubled
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ﬁrm’s loans. If they do, however, the results do not appear in Tables 8 and
9. The coefﬁcients on Dominant Shareholder are uniformly insigniﬁcant.
Simple summary statistics illustrate how dominant shareholders seem not
necessarily to increase the ability of ﬁrms to raise funds. Of the 51 ﬁrms in
our 1984 database with a dominant shareholder in 1981, 15 ﬁrms (29.4%)
cut the amount they borrowed over 1981-84; of the 83 ﬁrms without a
dominant shareholder, the amount of total loans fell at 21 ﬁrms (25.3%).
IV. THE LOGIC OF BANK RESCUES
Bankers do not spend their careers running industrial ﬁrms. They run banks.
Through their work, they do not learn to build cars or sell detergents. They
learn how to operate a heavily-regulated ﬁnancial intermediary. They may,
indeed, have been among the best students in their college class. But they
need more than IQ to run a ﬁrm. Just as bureaucrats could not successfully
run the Eastern European economy, bankers cannot run Japanese ﬁrms.
Talent is not expertise. "The biggest problem with having a bank control
management," complained one businessman, "is that bankers can’t stop
thinking like bankers. Sure, they can cut personnel and inventory. But they
don’t seem to realize that even in the middle of all the cut-backs, you’ve got
to plan for the future and invest in the right facilities."44AsMansakuTakeda,
senior consultant to the Daiichi Kangyo Bank, put it, "banks are places to
oversee loans. There’s no reason to think a banker has any talent for running
a ﬁrm, and there’re precious few examples of ﬁrms that did better because a
banker came to run them. ... Sure, bankers may be smart. But whether they
haveanymanagerialtalentis anotherissue."45
Despitethe broad claims about bankmonitoringand interventionin Japan,
bankers accomplished much less. As one late-1970s account put it, bankers
primarily intervened in ﬁrms with excessive investments.46 There, they did
not need to run the ﬁrm. Instead, they needed only to arrive, to sell, and to
leave.
Consistent with their slasher role, according to the same 1970s account,
bankers primarily intervened either where the industry had long-term
excess capacity or where a strong company CEO had ruled autocratically.
44 Ginko kanri [Bank Management], Shukan toyo keizai, Mar. 18, 1978, at 80, 87.
45 Mansaku Takeda, Ginko keiei no "genten" in kaeru toki [Returning to the
Fundamentals of Bank Management], Shukan toyo keizai, Mar. 11, 1978, at 40, 41.
46 Ginko kanri, supra note 44, at 83.
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Newspapers called the late 1970s recession a "structural depression," and the
structural changes fundamentally shifted Japanese comparative advantage.
In many industries, ﬁrms were unlikely ever to recover to their earlier levels:
sugar, somesteelsectors,aluminum, shipbuilding, textiles,chemicals,paper,
for example. Where the CEO had ruled autocratically, the ﬁrms had often
gambled heavily in markets like real estate or built unnecessary plant
capacity. Whether the ﬁrm was caught in a structural transformation or had
gambled and lost, it needed someone with a talent for numbers to come, sell
unneeded assets, and leave. That, bankers could do.
Given their limited ability, Japanese bankers avoid operating troubled
debtors if possible. Like bankers elsewhere, they instead pull their loans
when they can. So SHI and Hanasaki found, of course. When they needed
extra money, the banks did not offer loans and volunteer to run the ﬁrm.
Rather, they refused the money and pushed the ﬁrms toward bankruptcy.
Whatever the pretext, explained one 1970s bank ofﬁcer, "if a ﬁrm is in such
bad shape that a bank will have to run it, banks will want to pull their loans
if they can."47
By simple logic, if any entity were to "rescue" a ﬁrm, it would not be a
bank. Instead, it would be an industrial ﬁrm and probably a business partner.
First, such a ﬁrm would be more likely to have the expertise to overhaul the
troubled ﬁrm. Because such a ﬁrm’s executives ran an industrial operation
themselves, they would know better than bankers how to revamp the ﬁrm.
If from a business partner, they would even know the industry.
Second,anindustrialﬁrmwouldalsohaveastrongerincentivetointervene
than a bank. If ﬁrm A "rescues" ﬁrm B, necessarily A will increase B’s stock
price. An industrial ﬁrm can internalize that increase by buying B stock and
holding it as a subsidiary or internal division. A bank cannot. By law, a
Japanese bank can hold only 5% of a ﬁrm.
When a rescue does occur in Japan (and tens of thousands of ﬁrms simply
fail every year), the typical chronology begins with a non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm
that knows the distressed ﬁrm’s business. Mazda, for example, could make
good cars but needed to focus on marketing. The trading ﬁrms that handled
its account stood to lose business if it folded and, for that reason, helped
shift its managerial focus. To ﬁnance the transition, a troubled ﬁrm will
often need funds and, for that purpose, may ask its banks for a loan. Mazda
needed money and obtained it from its banks.
At root, the notion that Japanese bankers rescue ﬁrms parallels the notion
that Japanese bureaucrats guide the economy. Traditionally, both banks and
47 Id. at 84.
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the government recruited smart college graduates, but IQ alone will not
let a graduate build a car. Had bankers from the Sumitomo Bank really
known enough to turn around Mazda, they would have done better to build
the cars themselves. They did not build their own cars, of course, for the
same reason neither they nor government bureaucrats engineered Mazda’s
transformation: they did not know how.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the elaborate theory on point, our data on troubled ﬁrms from both
the 1970s and the 1980s provide no support for claims that Japanese main
banks rescue troubled ﬁrms — and if they do not rescue ex post, they do not
implicitly agree to rescue ex ante. That should not surprise — for at the point
of insolvency, banks and ﬁrms have fundamentally conﬂicting interests. The
ﬁrm’s employees and shareholders will welcome additional funds. The bank
will not. It will not want to chase bad money with good, and even less will
it want to chase the bad money only with its own good money, while the
ﬁrm’s shareholders and other lenders enjoy its obvious charity.
The stories about the "main bank system" are good stories — but at
root they are only stories, and too good to be true at that. The elaborate
Japan-speciﬁc theoretical permutations they foster may be attractive in the
abstract, but bear no relation to bank-ﬁrm relations in fact. As in other
countries, conﬂicts of interest matter in Japan. They matter now, and they
mattered twenty and thirty years ago. They affect the structures ﬁrms adopt,
the management strategies they pursue, and the deals they negotiate. A bit
less modern theory and a bit more attention to basic conﬂicts of interest and
we would understand a good bit more about Japanese business.
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